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Abstract 
The nature of dispersal of many invasive pests and pathogens in agricultural and forestry 
makes it necessary to consider how the actions of one manager affect neighbouring 
properties. In addition to the direct effects of a potential spread of a pest and the resulting 
economic loss, there are also indirect consequences that affect whole regions and that require 
coordinated actions to manage and/or to eradicate it (like movement restrictions). In this 
paper we address the emergence and stability of cooperation among agents who respond to a 
threat of an invasive pest or disease. The model, based on the weakest-link paradigm, uses 
repeated multi-participant coordination games where players’ pay-offs depend on 
management decisions to prevent the invasion on their own land as well as of their neighbours 
on a network. We show that for the basic cooperation game agents select the risk-dominant 
strategy of a Stag hunt game over the pay-off dominant strategy of implementing control 
measures. However, cooperation can be achieved by the social planner offering a biosecurity 
payment. The critical level of this payment depends on the details of the decision-making 
process, with higher trust (based on reputation of other agents reflecting their past 
performance) allowing significant reduction in necessary payments and slowing down decay 
in cooperation when the payment is low. We also find that allowing for uncertainty in 
decision-making process can enhance cooperation for low levels of payments. Finally, we 
show the importance of industry structure to the emergence of cooperation, with increase in 
the average coordination number of network nodes leading to increase in the critical 
biosecurity payment. 
 
  
1. Introduction 
There are many situations where failure to achieve an outcome depends not only on one's 
actions, but also the actions of others (Sims et al., 2016). For example, our efforts to prevent 
the spread of a disease can be undermined if someone else does not take appropriate 
precautions like hand washing, vaccination or protection (Kleczkowski et al., 2015; Maharaj 
and Kleczkowski, 2012). One particular case on which we focus in this paper involves 
biosecurity in agriculture and forestry (Macpherson et al., 2017, 2016). A lapse in biosecurity 
can result in the introduction and spread of animal and plant pests and pathogens, and can 
bring a large variety of negative consequences. These include the reduction in yield or quality 
of produce, reduced animal welfare, as well as the need to resort to costly and often unpopular 
reactive measures like widespread application of pesticides or culling. In addition, if one farm 
gets infected, biosecurity for others gets harder and so other farms are likely to follow, 
triggering a chain reaction (Fraser, 2016). Wider 'indirect' impacts from an infection that 
affect more than just the farms that initially get infected include regulatory and market 
impacts, such as trade bans, movement restrictions, culls and other biosecurity measures 
(Haydon et al., 2004; Knight-Jones and Rushton, 2013; Moslonka-Lefebvre et al., 2016).  
 
An example where indirect damages might be highly important is the case of a bacterial 
pathogen, Xylella fastidiosa (Forestry Commission, 2018). It is a multihost plant pathogen 
(with 350+ suspected plant host species), spread by xylem-feeding insects. It is endemic in 
many places in the world but some European countries, including the UK are so far free from 
it (Forestry Commission, 2018). X. fastidiosa has been spreading in southern European 
countries, devastating hosts like olive, almonds and oleander (Martelli et al., 2016). Given the 
wide array of host, many of whom are asymptomatic, likely impacts include non-market 
ecosystem damages as well as commercial production losses. In countries like the UK the 
current main concern is not the direct damages, as the most vulnerable host species are not 
economically important and the xylem-feeding insects are less active with the cooler climate, 
but indirect damages. In the UK, the same EU crop protection regulations apply as those in 
Italy or Spain where the pest is present, with long-term movement restrictions in the radius of 
10km around known outbreaks, lasting for as long as 5 years (Forestry Commission, 2018).  
 
For those that trade plants (e.g. plant nurseries) these regulations essentially mean destroying 
all hosts and a ban or severe restrictions in movement of host plants for a long period. 
Importantly, the damage is not limited to the trader that through negligence introduced the 
pathogen into the area, but to their neighbours over a potentially large geographic area. In 
addition, the response might also include contact tracing (similar to the one employed in 
controlling Foot and Mouth outbreak in the UK in 2001 (Haydon et al., 2004)) and so affect 
the sites located outside the immediate neighbourhood of the outbreak focus, but connected to 
it through trade. In short, if one agent employs lax biosecurity, other agents suffer. 
 
Issues around biosecurity can be considered as a weakest link public good, where efforts to 
produce a desired level of biosecurity are undermined by a single actor in the population, 
even if all other actors implement the prevention measures (Perrings et al., 2002). This 
feature, together with the assumptions that investment in biosecurity is costly, but only 
worthwhile if successful, can be captured in a game theoretical framework. In this paper we 
use the Stag hunt game paradigm to describe the strategic interaction among decision makers 
threatened with an outbreak of plant diseases. The key feature of the Stag hunt game (Skyrms, 
2013; Van Huyck et al., 1990) is the emergence of two Nash equilibria, one of which is pay-
off dominant (when all players invest in biosecurity) and the other risk dominant (no players 
invest in biosecurity). We extend the concept of the Stag hunt game to a multi-player situation 
(Rich et al., 2005a) in which the interactions are described by a network with a mixture of 
spatial (local) links, representing geographic proximity, and random (non-local) links, 
representing trade movements between players (for an application of network theory to plant 
health and particularly Xylella, see (Jeger et al., 2007; Strona et al., 2017)). 
 
The Stag hunt game has extensively been studied both theoretically (Büyükboyacı, 2014; van 
Veelen and Nowak, 2012; Weidenholzer and Simon, 2010) and in experiments (Banerjee et 
al., 2014, 2012), in a two-player and multi-player, network settings (Skyrms and Pemantle, 
2009; van Veelen and Nowak, 2012), and as a single or repeated game. The key feature 
emerging from these studies is that cooperation emerges only under very specific conditions. 
In this paper we apply the repeated Stag hunt game model to address the emergence of 
cooperation among plant nursery managers faced with a business-threatening pest or disease 
(Rich et al., 2005a, 2005b). We particularly seek answers to the following key questions: 
Given that cooperation is unlikely to emerge under the Stag hunt conditions, how much 
payment for implementing biosecurity is needed to achieve effective control of the disease in 
the landscape? Can the payment be lowered if we provide mechanisms for building up trust? 
How does the critical payment depend on uncertainty in pay-offs and boundedly- rational 
behaviour? How does behaviour depend on the industry structure, particularly the number of 
trading partners? 
 
2. Methods. 
We describe here a set of decision-making agents who broadly represent plant nursery 
managers, but who could also represent farmers growing crops or animals, or forest 
managers. Nurseries are connected to other nurseries either through local (geographical) links 
or through trade which can span the whole population; both types of links can facilitate spread 
of an invasive pest or disease. 
 
 
 Fig. 1 Network structure: (a) regular ring network representing geographical connections, (b) 
the small-world network characterised by the addition of m long-range random links, and (c) 
the rewired network. For clarity, M=25 and m=5. 
  
The network. We consider three network types. For the baseline case, we assume that the 
geographical structure is represented by a one-dimensional network with M=256 agents, d=2 
nearest neighbours and periodic boundary conditions, i.e. a ring, see Fig. 1(a). This could 
represent, for example, a set of nurseries based along a major road or railway; the period 
boundary condition simply allows us to ignore the influence of the end-points (van Veelen 
and Nowak, 2012). We subsequently extend the model to represent non-local trade described 
by an addition of m random links connecting any node in the network to another node, Fig. 
1(b). The resulting network has a small-world property (Jeger et al., 2007; Watts and 
Strogatz, 1998) with an increase in the average degree but large decrease in the average path 
length. For comparison, we also include a different small-world-type network, implementing 
the Watts-Strogatz rewiring algorithm (Watts and Strogatz, 1998); the network is formed 
from the basic ring structure by rewiring of (on average) m randomly selected links to 
anywhere in the population, Fig. 1(c). In such network the average degree does not change 
with m increasing, but the average path length decreases. The network is assumed to be static, 
with no response to the threats or changes in trading patterns (Gross et al., 2006). 
 
  
Basic game. At each period of time (which could represent a year or a trading round), the 
agent is faced with a risk created by an invasive potential pest or disease which can be 
transmitted to the nursery from another place. Each agent can choose either to control/prevent 
the disease (C) or to do nothing (N). In our approach we do not model the actual spread of the 
pest but assume that the agent expects that if no control measure is taken on its premises or if 
at least one of the geographical or trading partners does not control the pest, then the plants at 
the nursery will be affected, resulting in the decrease in pay-offs. The consequences of the 
action C or N, both for the agent and for the neighbours, are realised in the same round and 
have no direct long-lasting consequences (except loss or gain of trust, see below). 
 
Pay-offs. In each trading period, agents sell plants, with the healthy material bringing in the 
profit of a (arbitrary units) and the affected material bringing in b (arbitrary units), with 
b a< . The choice to control (C) is associated with a cost, c, independent of what neighbours 
do, while doing nothing (N) has no upfront cost. We additionally assume that the government 
tries to encourage the agents to control and in each period offers a subsidy p to each agent 
who chooses strategy C. The basic pay-off structure is given in Table 1. 
  
Table 1. Basic pay-off structure. In simulations we choose 16, 6, 6a b c= = =  (arbitrary 
units) and the second value in this table corresponds to this choice. 
 
Neighbourhood: 
Own action: 
C (all neighbours control) N (at least one neighbour 
does not control) 
C (control) a+p-c=10+p b+p-c=p 
N (do not control) b=6 b=6 
  
Repeated game. We assume that the game is played repeatedly and the agents have a full 
knowledge of the decisions of their neighbours in the past. Each agent’s actions are based on 
the expected pay-off which incorporates an estimate of what neighbours are going to do in the 
next step which we express in terms of two probabilities. 1( 0)i nP N +=  is the probability that 
in step n+1 all neighbours connected to the agent i will be implementing the control measures, 
whereas 1 1( 1) 1 ( 0)i n i nP N P N+ +≥ = − = represents the probability that at least one neighbour 
will not control. These probabilities can be evaluated assuming independence of neighbour 
decisions, 
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where inb  is the set of neighbours of agent i and ( ) 1j nP C + represents the probability that the 
neighbour j adopts the control strategy in step n, as estimated by agent i.  
 
Estimation of ( ) 1j nP C + . In the model we assume that this is based on the information on the 
past performance of the agents. In the simplest case, this can be simply dependent on the last 
period; if any of the neighbouring agents selects strategy C, we can assume that it is likely to 
do this again in the next step. Let 1nx =  if individual j played C at time n, and 0nx =
otherwise. Then, ( ) 1j nnP C x+ =  can be treated as an estimate that neighbour j will again 
choose the control strategy in the next step.  
 
A natural extension of this process incorporates a form of trust-building (Bloembergen et al., 
2015; Enright and Kao, 2015; Golman and Page, 2010; Skyrms, 2008) and bases the 
estimation of ( ) 1j nP C +  on a past history of the agent j’s actions (Horváth et al., 2012). In our 
approach this is based on as a weighted memory of whether that neighbour implemented 
control previously, but with recent actions having a greater weighting, so that the estimated 
probability that individual j implements control in step n+1 is given by 
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where 1kx =  if individual j played C at time k, and 0kx = otherwise. Here, τ  characterises 
how long past acts are remembered, with small values of τ  resulting in high weight placed 
on recent turns, whereas a large value ofτ  means that acts take a long time to be forgotten. In 
this way, τ  can be interpreted as a characteristic time over which the memory of past actions 
is kept. We arbitrarily assume that 0τ = corresponds to only the most recent event 
remembered, i.e. ( ) 1j nnP C x+ =  .  
 
Calculation of the pay-offs. Once the probabilities in Eq. (2) are calculated, the expected pay-
offs of the agent i can be computed as follows 
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where 1[ ]i nE C +  is the expected pay-off if the agent i chooses strategy C and 1[ ]i nE N + if 
chooses strategy N (note that the second expression simplifies to b). 
 
Pure and mixed strategies. Deterministically, the agent will choose the action that has the 
highest expected pay-off, i.e. will always choose strategy C if 1 1[ ] [ ]i n i nE C E N+ +≥ and 
strategy N if 1 1[ ] [ ]i n i nE C E N+ +< . However, this assumes that the agent possesses complete 
knowledge of the pay-offs and outcomes. In order to represent the uncertainty we use the idea 
of quantal response learning (Harsanyi, 1973; Mckelvey and Palfrey, 1998; Rosenthal, 1989). 
At each time step the agent i evaluates the expected pay-offs as described above but then 
chooses to play C randomly with probability   
 1
1 1
1Pr( )
1 exp( ( [ ] [ ] ))n
n n
C
E C E Nλ+ + +
=
+ − −
  (4) 
 
and N otherwise. This function varies with λ  between two extremes, the deterministic choice 
based on highest pay-off when λ → ∞   , and the indifference to expected pay-offs (i.e. a 
decision based on a coin-flip) for  0λ = when 1Pr( ) 1 2nC + = ; the chance of choosing to 
play C (N) increases as the expected pay-off for playing C (N) increases, see Fig. 2. 
  
 Fig. 2: Graph of the function given by Eq. (4), the probability of choosing the control 
strategy, as a function of difference in pay-offs. The dashed line illustrates the deterministic 
case of λ → ∞  , the thin solid line represents 1λ = , and the thick solid line to 0.2.λ =  
 
  
Initial conditions. We assume that at time n=0 a new (invasive) pest poses a threat to the 
agents and then study how cooperation evolves in response to this threat. We consider two 
different initial conditions, one where most (80%) agents cooperate at the start of the model, 
and one where most (80%) agents initially do not implement control (i.e. 20% implement 
control). The first case corresponds to the situation when the cooperation is a default 
behaviour and we study whether it survives the change in the conditions. In the second case, 
we study whether the full cooperation will emerge over the long time. 
 
Parameters.  The pay-off values in the paper are arbitrary and for simulation purposes we 
choose  16, 6, 6a b c= = = so that the profit from the infected material exactly balances the 
cost of control and the profit from the healthy material is higher than the profit from the 
infected material (note that the model considered here is invariant under the addition of the 
same constant to all terms in Table 1 simultaneously). Typically, 128 simulations are carried 
out for the network size of M=256 agents, with T=1024 repeated games starting with random 
initial conditions and involving random decisions based on Eq. (4), if applicable.  
 
3. Results 
A successful prevention or control of invasive diseases requires coordination of agent actions 
across the landscape. In this paper, we take it as our objective that as many agents as possible 
choose the control option (C) over the ‘do nothing’ option (N), given the level of payment, p. 
We particularly address the dependence of the critical biosecurity payment needed to achieve 
cooperation, cp  , on agents’ memory τ , the parameter capturing the bounded rational 
behaviour of the agents, λ , and the number of long-range links, m. 
 
Basic model. In absence of any additional payment (p=0) the two-agent, single-period model 
corresponds to a Stag hunt game as long as , ;a b p c p c− + > < that is when the difference 
in profits when selling healthy and diseased stock plus the payment for biosecurity are strictly 
larger than the cost of control. Which strategy is chosen depends on how the agent estimates 
the probability that the other player selects C (or N), ( ) 1j nP C +  . In the simplest case of 
( ) 1 1 2j nP C + = , strategy N is risk dominant for < 1p . However, in the ‘worst-case’ scenario, 
the agent needs to expect other players to fail to control the pest. Thus, ( ) 1 0j nP C + = and 
strategy N is risk dominant for <p c . 
 
For the network model, if the decision is based on the last choice made by the neighbours,
0τ = , and under the deterministic decision process, λ → ∞ , the result is similar to the 
‘worst-case’ scenario of the simple two-agent game, with the critical biosecurity payment of 
cp c= . If p c<  then the control strategy ceases to be adopted as time passes, independently 
of the initial condition, Fig. 3(a). This results from a contagious nature of strategy N: The 
knowledge that one of the agent neighbours selected N in the last step and therefore is 
expected to do it again makes the expected pay-off for cooperating worse than not knowing 
and just guessing what the neighbour(s) will do randomly. Thus, once the agent 
believes others are going to play N, it plays N in response. For p c≥ , the pay-off for 
selecting C is larger than selecting N even if ( ) 1 0j nP C + =  and so the number of agents 
adopting the control strategy increases until all agents cooperate (not shown here, but similar 
to Fig. 3(d)).  
  
 Fig. 3. The proportion of agents adopting the control strategy as a function of the number of 
repeated games, for λ → ∞  (a) and (c) and for 1.0λ =  (b) and (d); 0τ =  in (a) and (b), 
1τ =  in (c) and (d). System size is 256, with no long-range links. Solid lines represent 
median and dashed lines 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles simulated over 256 runs. Top set of 
curves corresponds to the initial number of agents adopting C of 80%, bottom set of curves 
for 20%. Biosecurity payment p=5 is below the critical value for the simple game, 6c = .  
  
Bounded rationality. As λ decreases, the agents stop always adopting the strategy with the 
higher expected pay-off and start occasionally making ‘mistakes’. For moderate 1λ = (while 
the decision is still based only on the last state, 0τ = ), the effect is twofold. Firstly, 
boundedly-rational behaviour leads to an increased range of values for the biosecurity 
payment p where cooperation levels in adopting control are high, Figs. 3(b) and 4(a). 
Secondly, some levels of cooperation persist for even smaller values of p, Fig. 3(b) and Fig. 
4(a), although disappear as p declines to 0, Fig. 4(a). This counterintuitive behaviour emerges 
because the ‘mistakes’ allow clusters of cooperation to appear and to persist. The key to the 
stability of a cluster formed of agents adopting the C strategy is the perception of risk of the 
disease spreading amongst individuals at the end points of the cluster. They are likely to 
switch to N if they expect their neighbours to adopt N in the next step. However, if p is close 
to c, the difference between pay-offs 1[ ]i nE C +  and 1[ ]i nE N + is small and so even if it is 
strictly speaking more profitable to adopt N, the agents are likely to still choose C (see Fig. 
2).  
  
 Fig. 4: The proportion of agents adopting the control strategy as a function of biosecurity 
payment, p, for (a) no memory ( 0τ = ) but different values of λ → ∞  (green), 1λ =  (red) 
and 0.2λ =  (blue), and (b) for 1.0λ =  with different memory levels, 0τ =  (red), 1τ =  
(thick black) and 10τ =  (thin black); the red curves are the same in (a) and (b). M=256, with 
no long-range links. Solid lines represent the median and dashed lines 2.5% and 97.5% 
quantiles simulated over 128 runs after 2048 periods. Initially 80% of the agents adopt 
control; the result for 20% is very similar after the transient behaviour shown in Fig. 3. 
If λ  is reduced even more, the agents will display increasingly random behaviour without 
paying attention to what the neighbours have been doing. We find that full cooperation is no 
longer possible, even if the biosecurity payment is increased to p=c, but likewise some 
cooperation occurs even in the absence of the biosecurity payment, p, Fig. 4(a). As 0λ → , 
the proportion of agents selecting strategy C tends to 1/2 independently of other parameters or 
the biosecurity payment, p.  
 
Memory and trust. As the agents start paying more attention to the past events so that 0τ > , 
the initial condition plays a more important role and the variability in the temporal path 
increases, Fig. 3(c), with some configuration of clusters of cooperation taking a very long 
time to convert to the N strategy.  
 
When memory is short (small τ ), the main effect is to shift the critical value of the 
biosecurity payment, cp , towards low values, thus enhancing cooperation, cf. Figs. 3(c) and 
3(d); summarised in Fig. 4(b). Note that this requires some level of ‘bounded rationality’ to 
allow the neighbours of those who played N for a long time to consider playing C, as cp c=
for any value of τ  if λ → ∞ . For high levels of memory retention, 10τ = , the region of 
biosecurity payment leading to consistent high cooperation levels is considerably widened, 
Fig. 4(b). Thus, even if the agent neighbour plays N once after having played C for a long 
time, its neighbours are likely to ignore this and continue playing C; this leads to a reduced 
‘contagion’ of the N strategy, but also requires some level of bounded-rational behaviour. 
 
  
 Fig. 5: (a) and (b): The average proportion of agents choosing to control after T=1024 steps as 
a function of the number of random long-range links and the biosecurity payment; red colour 
represents no cooperation, orange to yellow represents increasing cooperation, and white 
corresponds to complete cooperation. (c) and (d): the average degree, (e) and (f) the 
proportion of agents with 3 or more connections (black) and 4 or more connections (blue), 
and (g) and (h) the average path length for networks used in (a) and (b). Left column 
corresponds to small-world networks formed by addition of long-range links and right column 
to rewired small-world networks. Other parameters: M=256, 1λ =  and 1τ = ; the initial 
proportion of cooperators is 80% and the number of replicates is 25.  
  
Trade and random links. The results so far assume a network of interactions with every agent 
influenced by their two nearest neighbours. As the number of additional long-range links 
representing trade increase, the critical biosecurity payment needed to encourage cooperation 
in disease control also increases for the addition network, Fig. 5(a). This is to be expected, as 
the additional links increase the average degree, Fig. 5(c), which means more agents are 
needed to adopt the control strategy for the population-level cooperation to succeed. 
However, the rewired network has a constant average degree, Fig. 5(d) with 5(c), but also 
shows the loss of cooperation as the proportion of non-local links increases, Fig. 5(b). Both 
networks are characterised by an increasing proportion of agents with 3 or more (and 4 or 
more) connections, Figs. 5(e) and 5(f). Thus, the loss of cooperation appears to be primarily 
associated with the increase in the proportion of agents who have more links. Such agents are 
less likely to select strategy C, as they perceive a higher risk of damage from trading links.  
 
4. Discussion and Conclusions. 
High risks of invasive pests and diseases like X. fastidiosa often lead authorities to impose 
draconian consequences if the disease agent is found on the premises. Moreover, not only 
those directly involved are affected by the emergency control measures, but also their 
neighbours will likely lose profits (and in the extreme, livelihoods). In this paper we have 
developed a modelling framework based on the concept of a weakest link public good and 
used it to examine conditions under which cooperation can emerge in the population of agents 
potentially affected by the spread of a pest or disease.  
 
The lack of control in our model is a very strong transferable externality, as even a single 
person who does not implement biosecurity measures can cause huge losses across the whole 
industry (Shogren and Crocker, 1991). Hence, a rational response of agents to the disease 
threat is to mistrust their neighbours and assume the worst outcome – if any of them decides 
not to control the pest, all will be affected. As a result, agents tend to give up the control 
strategy, unless the state subsidy for biosecurity, p, fully compensates them for the costs of 
control, c. Hence, even if we start with a population in which almost all agents initially 
control, the agents most in contact with those that do not control will find that the best 
strategy is to cease to implement precautionary control, eventually resulting in the loss of 
cooperation in the whole population.  
 
In the paper, we have explored ways in which behavioural mechanisms (bounded rationality, 
trust) can lower the critical threshold and, finally, what the role of long-range trade is. We 
found that both trust and bounded rationality tend to lead to higher levels of cooperation, even 
if the biosecurity payment is lower than the costs of control. In particular, the dependence of 
the agent’s choice of strategy on the past decisions of their neighbours significantly increases 
the chances that the cooperation will emerge in the whole system, with the critical values of 
the biosecurity payment decreasing with increasing the characteristic time for the memory, .τ
However, even if cp p< for a given value of τ , cooperation can persist for a long time, as 
exemplified in Fig. 3(c). Interestingly, the persistence time (defined here as the time needed 
for the proportion of agents adopting the control strategy to drop from 80% to 20%) scales 
with τ  according to a power law, 1.80.2 5.3T τ= × , Fig. 6. Thus, a relatively modest increase 
in τ  can lead to a disproportionate increase in the persistence of cooperation. This effect 
stresses the importance of mechanisms that help to build trust in a framework that is 
inherently built on mistrust (as the agents expect to be affected even if only one neighbour 
does not implement control). 
 
  
  
Fig. 6: The dependence of the time taken for the proportion of agents adopting the control 
strategy to drop from the initial 80% to 20%, 0.2T , on the characteristic time for memory, τ , 
Eq. (2); solid line represents the median and the dashed lines the 95% confidence intervals 
based on 64 replicates. Note the double logarithmic scale, with a straight line in red 
representing the least square fit to all points, ( ) ( )0.2ln lnT α β τ= +  with 1.674 0.025α = ±  
and 1.824 0.0144β = ± , F=16,118 (5666df), 2 0.74R = . Other parameters: p=0, M=256, 
m=0, λ → ∞ , T=1024.    
Interestingly, the increased potential for ‘errors’ in calculating expected profits corresponding 
to decreasing λ  also makes cooperation more likely, unless the difference in pay-offs is high 
(Gächter, 2017). This can be associated with ‘forgiveness’, as the agents are more likely to 
forget one period when a neighbour ‘cheated’ and did not implement control, assuming the 
loss is not very big. This mechanism offsets the contrasting behaviour when the agent makes 
a mistake in the other direction and stops controlling even though all its neighbours choose to 
control. This also points in the direction of future research that would attempt to capture in 
more detail the decision-making process of agents faced with invasive disease or pest threats. 
 
Industry structure also plays an important role in determining whether cooperation emerges or 
persists in the population, given our interpretation of industry structure as representing the 
number of trading links between farmers/foresters. Our results show that this is primarily 
driven agents who have more trading “neighbours” being less likely to adopt the control 
strategy. Those individuals then play a similar role to non-cooperators in Enright & Kao, 
(2015), although in our model there is no additional heterogeneity in their behaviour. More 
work is needed to identify whether the network topology, as exemplified here by the average 
path length, Fig. 5(g) and 5(h), also influences the dynamics of cooperation. In addition, in 
our model the network structure is fixed, whereas in reality, the agents might respond to 
disease threat by rewiring the trading pattern in the repeated game; such dynamic and 
adaptive networks have been a subject of intense research (Gross et al., 2006; Maharaj and 
Kleczkowski, 2012) and our model can be extended in this direction.  
 
In our model, the process of actual disease spread is not explicitly incorporated in the 
framework, as we only look at the response of the agents to the disease threat (rather than the 
disease presence). This is probably the reason why network topology does not seem to play as 
important a role as the number of neighbours. An obvious extension of the model would be to 
incorporate an explicit epidemiological component to the model which represents the process 
of pathogen or pest spread and growth. Another extension would be incorporation of 
heterogeneity in the agent pay-offs (e.g. the profit from selling the healthy stock, a, or the cost 
of control, c) in addition to the number of connections considered in this paper. 
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